
Franz Payer Tactical Network Solutions http://cyberexplo.it

EXPLOITING MUSIC STREAMING WITH JAVASCRIPT

#### Acknowledgements

Zachary Cutlip
Craig Heffner
Tactical Network Solutions



### Special Thanks

- Ronald Jenkees
  - Independent artist
  - http://www.ronaldjenkees.com

## Legal

EFF (www.eff.org)
DMCA (Digital Millennium Copyright Act)
CFAA (Computer Fraud and Abuse Act)
Opinions/views expressed here are mine, not my employer's

## What I'm going to talk about

Background info
Music streaming basics
Security investigation process
Exploit demo
Questions

### End-Goal

#### Google-Chrome Extension

- Mimics music player when possible
- Duplicates requests otherwise

#### Alternative

- Duplicates request + caches
- Hex-dump analysis

#### Wall of shame



#### GIOOVESHUIK

#### What is streaming?

- A way to constantly receive and present data while it is being delivered by a provider – Wikipedia
  - Capture data pieces
    - Reassembly
    - Encryption

## What is streaming?

#### Protocols

- Custom protocol Desktop apps
- HTTP/HTTPS Browser apps
- 2 types
  - Static
    - http://cd09.128.music.static.jango.com/music/10/47/34/1047349946.mp3

#### Dynamic

http://stream126-he.grooveshark.com/stream.php?
 streamKey=1202c0ba6260e12c0b84d64b72845181d3195496\_51eaabf9\_24f1b
 63\_2cb51a8\_e0616020\_36\_0

## Types of music players

#### Flash

- Majority
- May still use JavaScript
- Must decompile
- Separate environment

#### HTML5

- Experimental
- Entirely in JavaScript
- Usually minified

## Where's the vulnerability?

- Browser does heavy liftingTwo ways to exploit
  - Copy requests
    - Easy
    - Suspicious
    - Limitations
    - Generate requests
    - Difficult
    - Undetectable w/ sessions

#### Investigation process

Breadth before depth Locate music file in network traffic Filter by XHR traffic + sort by type Inspect any parameters in the request Locate origin of those parameters Page URL Page source localStorage JavaScript

Attempt to replicate the request

## Target: Aimini



- Flash
  - Almost nonexistent security
  - Good first target
  - Don't even need to look at the code

### Analyzing network traffic


Elements Resources Network So	ources	Timeline	Profiles Audits Console F	PageSpeed		
Name Path	Method	Status Text	Туре	Initiator	Size Content	Time Latency
<pre>?pid=eLRJFW8CVxwrHa0905ne /view/from</pre>	GET	200 OK	text/html	Other	1.0 KB 1.5 KB	<b>96 ms</b> 95 ms
w.php?hm=.net_View_&_lh_= www.aimini.com/webcounter	GET	<b>200</b> ОК	text/html	<u>www.aimini.</u> Script	<b>267 В</b> 4 В	<b>84 ms</b> 84 ms
who_120x90_f.jpg img.aimini.net	GET	304 Not Mod	image/jpeg	<u>www.aimini.</u> Parser	<b>174 В</b> 2.5 КВ	<b>42 ms</b> 42 ms
?file=http://1.x.f.x.aimini.net/pla 1.x.f.x.aimini.net/player/mp3	GET	200 OK	application/x-shockwave-flash	<u>content.js:30</u> Script	(from c	<b>25 ms</b> 25 ms
?fid=XFx1jWz0zJmWApIjZdwo 1.x.f.x.aimini.net/play	GET	200 OK	audio/mp3	Other	(from c	<b>185 ms</b> 4 ms

13 requests | 8.4 KB transferred | 1.40 s (onload: 970 ms, DOMContentLoaded: 776 ms)

#### The easy way out

Elem	nents Resourc	es Network	So	ources	Timeline	Profiles Audits Console I	PageSpeed		
Name Path				Method	Status Text	Туре	Initiator	Size Content	Time Latency
	<b>?fid=XFx1jWz0z</b> . /view	lmWApIjZdwo		GET	<b>200</b> OK	text/html	Other	<b>6.1 KB</b> 22.2 KB	<b>415 ms</b> 386 ms
	?fid=XFx1jWz0z 1.x.f.x.aimini.net			GET	200	audio/mp3	Other	(from c	<b>185 ms</b> 4 ms
	?fid=XFx1jWz0z. 1.x.f.x.aimini.net		n ne	w tab	Mod	image/jpeg	<u>www.aimini.</u> Parser	124 B 8.6 KB	<b>184 ms</b> 183 ms
	?file=http://1.x.t 1.x.f.x.aimini.net		Copy link address Copy request headers Copy response headers		cel	Pending	<u>content.js:3</u> Script	13 B 0 B	83 ms -
	?file=http://1.x.f 1.x.f.x.aimini.net	Conversion				application/x-shockwave-flash	<u>content.js:30</u> Script	(from c	<b>25 ms</b> 25 ms
	2pid-el PIEW8C	Convias cu	el					1.0.KB	96.mc

#### The easy way out



#### Analyzing the song request

Headers Preview Response

Θ

#### Looking for parameters

#### www.aimini.net/view/?fid=XFx1jWz0zJmWApIjZdwo

### Target: Grooveshark



HTML5 (http://html5.grooveshark.com/)
Several factors of authentication
Minified JavaScript
Not for the faint of heart
Keep track of what you are doing

#### JavaScript beautifier

# You' re going to need ithttp://jsbeautifier.org/

window.GS.tpl={"getapp.ejs":function(obj){va '<a class="get-app" href="http://m.groovesha " <span>"+ .getString("GET IT HERE")+"</span Array.prototype.join.call(arguments,"")};wit '</h3>\n\n id="nav-u .getString("PROFILE")+'</a>\n \n '/collection" data-translate-text="COLLECTIO '/favorites" data-translate-text="FAVORITES" '/playlists" data-translate-text="PLAYLISTS" '/following" data-translate-text="FOLLOWING" with(obj||{}) p+='<div class="banner">\n (image.alt||"")+'">\n </a>\n ',hasClos {var p="", print=function() { p+=Array.prot '" alt="'+(image.alt||"")+'">\n</a>';return "";var style="";style+="animation-duration:

window.GS.tpl = { "getapp.ejs": function (obj) { var p = "", print = function () { p += Array.prototype.join. 1: with(obj || {}) p += '<a class="ge</pre> platform: platform }) + " <span>" + .getString("GET II return p }, "user menu.ejs": function (obj) { var p = "", print = function () {

## Analyzing the song request

Request URL: http://stream57-he.grooveshark.com/stream.php?streamKey=c94f2fd4d8f82737e441f065312436ef
Request Method: GET
Status Code: Θ 206 Partial Content
▼Request Headers view source
Accept: */*
DNT: 1
Host: stream57-he.grooveshark.com
Range: bytes=0-
Referer: http://html5.grooveshark.com/
▼Query String Parameters view source view URL encoded
streamKey: c94f2fd4d8f82737e441f065312436ef3e0fb288_51d8e195_24f1b63_2cb51a8_daa87234_36_0
▼Response Headers view source
Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate
Connection: close
Content-Length: 7984685
Content-Range: bytes 0-7984684/7984685
Content-Type: audio/mpeg

## Analyzing more.php

Request URL: http://html5.grooveshark.com/more.php?getStreamKeyFromSongIDEx Request Method: POST Status Code: \varTheta 200 OK Query String Parameters view source view URL encoded getStreamKeyFromSongIDEx: Request Payload view source # {header:{client:mobileshark, clientRevision:20120830, privacy:0,...}, method:getStreamKeyFromSongIDEx,...} w header: {client:mobileshark, clientRevision:20120830, privacy:0,...} client: "mobileshark" clientRevision: "20120830" > country: {ID:223, CC1:0, CC2:0, CC3:0, CC4:1073741824, DMA:512, IPR:0} privacy: 0 session: "86950c0f84cc66f2e26e92b869c5d4e1" token: "1f2ad15df0392695236c07d9ae968c3489a8a8cf9db3a6" uuid: "38D1D238-7C51-4B5F-9EDB-F79B70DE7EE5" method: "getStreamKeyFromSongIDEx" ▼ parameters: {prefetch:false, mobile:true, songID:38738787,...} ▶ country: {ID:223, CC1:0, CC2:0, CC3:0, CC4:1073741824, DMA:512, IPR:0} mobile: true prefetch: false songID: 38738787

## Analyzing more.php

```
Request URL: https://html5.grooveshark.com/more.php?getCommunicationToken
Request Method: POST
Status Code: ● 200 OK

V Query String Parameters view source view URL encoded
getCommunicationToken:
V Request Payload view source
V {header:{client:mobileshark, clientRevision:20120830,...}, method:getCommunicationToken,...}
    header: {client:mobileshark, clientRevision:20120830,...}
    method: "getCommunicationToken"
    v parameters: {secretKey:51f4d8932bdc94f2dc777e9f00a205ee}
    secretKey: "51f4d8932bdc94f2dc777e9f00a205ee"
```

#### So now what?

- We need:
  - streamKey
- How do we get it?
  - more.php getStreamKeyFromSongIDEx
  - Session ?
  - Token ?
  - UUID ?
  - songID ?

more.php - getCommunicationToken

## Looking through app.min.js

window.GS.config

vObject {country: Object, runMode: "production", IP: " country: Object lang: "en" runMode: "production" sessionID: "86950c0f84cc66f2e26e92b869c5d4e1" user: Object proto : Object

#### window.GS.models.queue.models

- [▼t.hasOwnProperty.i 💽
  - Locallbacks: Object
    \_changed: false
    \_changing: false
  - \_escapedAttributes: Object
  - \_previousAttributes: Object
  - attributes: Object cid: "c30"
  - collection: t.hasOwnProperty.i id: 38738787

```
__proto__: y
```

#### Recap

- We need:
  - streamKey
- How do we get it?
  - more.php getStreamKeyFromSongIDEx
  - Session window.GS.config
  - Token ?
  - UUID ?
  - songID window.GS.models.queue.models more.php - getCommunicationToken

```
loaded: function () {
    return this.length > 0 || !! this._loaded
    }
}, _.mixin({
    UUID: function () {
        return "xxxxxxx-xxxx-4xxx-yxxx-xxxxxx".replace(/[xy]/g, function (e) {
            var t = Math.random() * 16 | 0,
            n = e == "x" ? t : t & 3 | 8;
            return n.toString(16)
        }).toUpperCase()
    },
    getString: function (e, n) {
        var r = $.localize.getString(e),
    }
}
```

#### Recap

- We need:
  - streamKey
- How do we get it?
  - more.php getStreamKeyFromSongIDEx
  - Session window.GS.config
  - Token ?
  - UUID copied function from app.min.js
     songID window.GS.models.queue.models
     more.php getCommunicationToken

var p;

r.lastRandomizer = o();

```
p = hex_sha1([this.method, r.currentToken, r.revToken, r.lastRandomizer].join(":"));
```

```
f.header.token = r.lastRandomizer + p
```

RequestURL: http://html5.grooveshark.com/more.php?getStreamKeyFromSongIDEx
Request Method: POST
Status Code: \varTheta 200 OK
Query String Parameters view source view URL encoded
getStreamKeyFromSongIDEx:
Request Payload view source
<pre>▼ {header:{client:mobileshark, clientRevision:20120830, privacy:0,}, method:getStreamKeyFromSongIDEx,}</pre>
▼header: {client:mobileshark, clientRevision:20120830, privacy:0,…}
client: "mobileshark"
clientRevision: "20120830"
▶ country: {ID:223, CC1:0, CC2:0, CC3:0, CC4:1073741824, DMA:512, IPR:0}
privacy: 0
session: "86950c0f84cc66f2e26e92b869c5d4e1"
token: "1f2ad15df0392695236c07d9ae968c3489a8a8cf9db3a6"
uuid: "38D1D238-7C51-4B5F-9EDB-F79B70DE7EE5"
method: "getStreamKeyFromSongIDEx"
▼parameters: {prefetch:false, mobile:true, songID:38738787,…}
▶ country: {ID:223, CC1:0, CC2:0, CC3:0, CC4:1073741824, DMA:512, IPR:0}
mobile: true
prefetch: false
songID: 38738787

```
var p;
```

```
r.lastRandomizer = o();
p = hex_sha1([this.method, r.currentToken, r.revToken, r.lastRandomizer].join(":"));
f.header.token = r.lastRandomizer + p
```

```
function o() {
    var e = "";
    for (var t = 0; t < 6; t++) e += Math.floor(Math.random() * 16).toString(16);
    return e != r.lastRandomizer ? e : o()
</pre>
```

```
var p;
r.lastRandomizer = o();
p = hex sha1([this.method, r.currentToken, r.revToken, r.lastRandomizer].join(":"));
f.header.token = r.lastRandomizer + p
                        INVALID CLIENT: 1024,
                        RATE LIMITED: 512,
                        INVALID TOKEN: 256,
                        INVALID SESSION: 16,
                        MAINTENANCE: 10,
                        MUST BE LOGGED IN: 8,
                        EMPTY RESULT: -256
                    },
                   headers: {
                        client: "mobileshark",
                        clientRevision: "20120830"
                    },
                   revToken: n,
```

```
var p;
r.lastRandomizer = o();
p = hex_shal([this.method, r.currentToken, r.revToken, r.lastRandomizer].join(":"));
f.header.token = r.lastRandomizer + p
```

```
Request URL: https://html5.grooveshark.com/more.php?getCommunicationToken
Request Method: POST
Status Code: ● 200 OK

VQuery String Parameters view source view URL encoded
h(), r.tokenPending = !0, r.sessionID ? (e = hex_md5(r.sessionID),
secretKey: e
    header: {client:mobileshark, clientRevision:20120830,...}
    method: "getCommunicationToken"
    vparameters: {secretKey:51f4d8932bdc94f2dc777e9f00a205ee"
```

#### Recap

- We need:
  - streamKey
- How do we get it?
  - more.php getStreamKeyFromSongIDEx
  - Session window.GS.config
  - Token getCommunicationToken
  - UUID copied function from app.min.js
  - songID window.GS.models.queue.models
  - more.php getCommunicationToken

#### Demo Time



#### Things I learned

Downloading music is inconvenient
Services were fairly easy to exploit
Impossible to completely protect streaming

#### Things you should know

People have bad security (shocker)
Several services will patch their code now
Several services won't patch their code
The same web-traffic logging will work with some video streaming websites too.

#### Case Study: Last.fm

#### Heavily secured

- Cap bandwidth to match playback speed
- One use tokens
- Users may only have 1 stream open at a time
- Could not exploit
- Would require large amount of time
- Hundreds of lines of obfuscated code
- Bandwidth cap prevents stealing of entire library

## Mitigations

Current technology

- One-time use tokens
- Encrypted streams (rtmpe)
- Returning songs in pieces
- Code obfuscation
- Future proofing:
  - HTML5 audio tag with DRM support

"HTTP Live Streaming as a Secure Streaming Method" – Bobby Kania, Luke Gusukuma

#### References

#### Browsershark

- <u>https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/browsershark/</u>
   jhbjnipjccjloncefdoknhicbnbjaefh</u>
- Or <u>bit.ly/18UpQtb</u>
- https://github.com/fpayer/browsershark
- Blog
  - http://cyberexplo.it/
- HTTP Live Streaming as a Secure Streaming Method
  - <u>http://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/bitstream/handle/10919/18662/</u> <u>Instructions%20for%20HTTP%20Live%20Streaming</u> <u>%20Final.pdf</u>
  - **JS Beautifier** 
    - http://jsbeautifier.org/

#### Contact

Twitter: @franz780 fpayer@tacnetsol.com

### Questions?