

GoPro or GTFO

A Tale of Reversing an Embedded System

Agenda

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Conclusion



INTRO



About Us

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 - Previously Mgr. of Security Research at BreakingPoint Systems
- Zach Lanier a.k.a. "quine"
 - Sr. Research Consultant, Accuvant LABS' Applied Research Consulting
 - (Net | App | Web | Mobile) pen tester type

Why the GoPro?

- Highly popular, consumer "rugged" camera
- WiFi-enabled
- Possible applicability to other Amberella-based devices
 - Including commercial IP-enabled CCTV installations
- We focused mainly on GoPro Hero3 Black Edition
 - So *most* details apply, but may be some HW differences
- Plus: IT'S EXTREEEEEEEEEEEEEE



GOPRO OVERVIEW



GoPro Overview

- Ambarella A770 camera SoC
 - ARMv6 1136J-S core (@528MHz)
- Sitronix ST7585 LCD
- Atheros AR6233GEAM2D 802.11n + BT controller
- and more...

GoPro Overview

- H3B runs two operating systems:
 - ITRON
 - Embedded RTOS
 - Manages most of the camera bits
 - Runs the "GoPro" Webserver on 80/tcp
 - "Internal" interface to Linux (10.9.9.9)
 - Linux 2.6.38
 - Actually runs as a task within ITRON
 - Resides on private/internal network (10.9.9.1)
 - Runs Cherokee webserver on 80/tcp, but port fwd'ed from 8080/tcp externally



PREVIOUS RESEARCH



Evil Wombat!

- O.G. contributor to GoPro forum
- ARM firmware developer (???)
- Discovered (and shared) autoexec.ash
 - Script that runs on boot, can enable such fun things as serial console, telnetd, etc.
- Wrote firmware parsers, camera "unbrick" tool, and techniques for direct booting Linux kernel
- If you're in the audience, plz to be letting us buy you a drink



ambsh

• Amberella shell - limited shell accessible over serial/USB

***************************************	***************************************	**
*		*
* ambs	h;)	*
*		*
***************************************	***************************************	**
BST (178034), HAL (178034), CHIF rtos mesg disabled dsp mesg disabled type 'help' for help	(a7)	
a:\>		

- Discovery courtesy of Evil Wombat
 - Drop the following into autoexec.ash on SD card, reboot camera:

```
sleep 4
t app test usb_rs232 1
```

Side note: what not to do

a:\> t nand_op erase 0 10 erase block 0 erase block 1 erase block 2 erase block 3 erase block 4 erase block 5 erase block 6 erase block 7 erase block 8 erase block 9 success

You have a successful failure, and now your camera is bricked.

lu_util

- ITRON uses IPC message queue for bi-directional, inter-OS messaging (more on this later)
- lu_util is iTRON-to-Linux utility
 - Execute commands within Linux, such as enabling telnetd
 - Once again, discovery courtesy of Evil Wombat
 - Drop the following into autoexec.ash on SD card:

```
sleep 30
lu_util exec 'pkill cherokee'
lu_util exec '/usr/sbin/telnetd -1 /bin/
sh -p 80'
```



Root shell ;)

With telnetd enabled, root shell!

```
user@hi:~$ telnet 10.5.5.9 8080
Trying 10.5.5.9...
Connected to 10.5.5.9.
Escape character is '^]'.
```

```
/ # id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root)
/ # uname -a
Linux buildroot 2.6.38.8 #1 PREEMPT Fri Mar 1 18:03:04 PST 2013 armv6l GNU/Linux
```



METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS



Analysis - "GoPro App" Mode

- Camera acts as access point
- Mobile app connects to two webservers on camera:
 - "GoPro" Web Server for control / settings
 - Cherokee for "real time" video preview (MPEG-TS)
 - App retrieves playlist from Cherokee with eight (8) 0.3 second clips for "streaming" preview
- WiFi Bacpac uses 10.5.5.9



Analysis - "WiFi Remote" Mode

- Remote acts as access point, camera acts as mobile station/client
 - Remote/AP does not use any security totally open
- Camera scans for HERO-RC-XXXXXX (where XX... are the last three octets of the BSSID/ MAC of the remote)
 - Prefers known BSSID, but can be configured to "pair" with new remote



Network Attack Surface

- Cherokee webserver (Linux)
 - Runs as root, despite listening on unpriv'ed port
 - No addt'l mitigations enabled (aside from NX & ASLR)
 - Exec base is not randomized





Network Attack Surface

- GoPro webserver (ITRON), in Mobile App mode
- Control of bacpac and camera
 - http://10.5.5.9/bacpac/...
 - http://10.5.5.9/camera/...
- Passes WPA2 passphrase as auth token
 - e.g. http://10.5.5.9/camera/cv?t=*MYWPA2KEY*

Local Attack Surface - Linux

- No priv separation everything runs as root
- ASLR enabled system wide
- Decent slew of useful commands
 - Busybox
 - GoPro-specific tools
- Numerous "interesting" commands/daemons
 - amba_mq_handler
 - ombra
 - network_message_daemon
 - Amongst other things, parses JSON messages passed on 7878/tcp (not remotely accessible)



IPC - Linux side

Message queue

/ # ip	cs-p	_		
shmid	Sharea Hellor	y Creator/L cpid	•	
	Message Queu	es PIDs		
msqid	owner	lspid	lrpid	
0	root	788	753	
32769	root	Θ	Θ	
65538	root	Θ	Θ	

Points to queue used by amba_mq_handler which handles IPC from Linux <-> ITRON

753 root 0:00 amba_mq_handler

IPC - ITRON side

Numerous registered IPC programs (viewable in ambsh with ipcprog command)

a:\> ipcprog

Registered IPC programs

servers: i_status i_util i_ffs i_sdresp i_mq i_wifi_display i_dvf2web i_streamer i_heapmem i_example_util i_example_framer clients: lk_util lu_util lu_net_config lu_wifi_config lu_dvf2web lu_streamer lu_rappctrl lk_sdresp lu_mq lu_lnxfio_stream lk_example_util lu_example_util lu_example_framer

i status (S	5) P:0	×10000	002,	, V:1 N:3				
0xc0342bcc	1	4	Θ	000000000	Θ	000000000	Θ	500 lk status report
0xc0342c14	2	4	Θ	000000000	Θ	000000000	Θ	500 lk boss version report
0xc0342da0	3	28	Θ	000000000	Θ	00000000	Θ	500 lk_time_event
i util (S)	P:0x1	.000000	1, \	/:1 N:17				
0xc0342ee0	1	Θ	8	000000000	Θ	000000000	Θ	500 itron gettimeofday
0xc0342f00	2	4	Θ	c0912f5c	1	000000000	Θ	500 itron printk
0xc0342fa0	3	256	Θ	000000000	Θ	000000000	Θ	500 itron fixed printk
0xc0343088	4	4	Θ	000000000	Θ	000000000	Θ	500 itron async ipc
0xc03430d0	5	Θ	Θ	000000000	Θ	000000000	Θ	500 itron pm suspend
0xc0343118	6	Θ	Θ	000000000	Θ	000000000	Θ	500 itron pm resume
0xc0343138	7	Θ	Θ	000000000	Θ	000000000	Θ	500 lk report ready
0xc0343168	8	Θ	Θ	000000000	Θ	000000000	Θ	500 lk report resume
0xc0343198	9	Θ	Θ	000000000	Θ	000000000	Θ	500 lk request suspend
0xc03431c8	10	Θ	Θ	000000000	Θ	000000000	Θ	500 lk request shutdown
0xc03431fc	11	Θ	8	000000000	Θ	c0912f60	1	500 lk get exfb
0xc0343244	12	Θ	Θ	000000000	Θ	000000000	Θ	500 lk report fb owned
0xc0343274	13	Θ	Θ	000000000	Θ	000000000	Θ	500 lk_report_fb_released
0xc03432a4	14	Θ	4	000000000	Θ	c0912f64	1	500 lk_absuspend_check
0xc03432bc	15	Θ	Θ	000000000	Θ	000000000	Θ	500 lk_absuspend_enter
0xc03432d4	16	Θ	Θ	000000000	Θ	000000000	Θ	500 lk absuspend exit
0xc0343344	17	8	Θ	000000000	Θ	000000000	Θ	500 lk set device owner

FUTURE RESEARCH & NEXT STEPS



Future Research

- Remote monitoring
 - Legitimate, bespoke 3rd party clients
 - Using the camera to spy
 - Following up on accessibility of MPEG-TS streaming
- Dumping firmware from WiFi Remote
- GoPro 30-pin bus interface
 - Remarkably similar to Apple i-device connector
 - Used for interfacing with product add-on devices
- Backdoors, persistence, blah blah blah



Code, notes, etc.

https://github.com/quine/GoProGTFO

Watch this space! Will drop public scripts, tools, etc. here soon



Questions / Contact

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bNull, jono, aloria, cji, d0c_s4vage, KF, cmulliner, natron, tigerbeard, jduck, m0nk_dot, drspringfield, zek, marcinw, sl0w, drraid, amberalla, solareclipse, katalyst, cd, sbit, awr, tkrpata, kingpin, thegrugq, eas, rumble, ddz, sa7ori, HockeyInJune, pof, oxff, zenofex, hustlelabs, redpantz, cmillerchrisko, mcalias, rfp

And the rest of the jerks in #busticati & #aha

And to anyone we forgot: sorry.



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