

DDoS Protecion Total Annihilation 🕊 🔀





TO SERVE AND TO PROTECT



Industry body formed to foster synergy among stakeholders to promote advancement in DDoS defense knowledge.



Independent academic R&D division of Nexusguard building next generation DDoS mitigation knowledge and collaborate with defense community.



AGENDA

- DDoS Relevance, Attack Categories, Detection & Mitigation
- Source Host Verification: Authentication Methods
 - TCP SYN Auth
 - HTTP Redirect Auth
 - HTTP Cookie Auth
 - JavaScript Auth
 - CAPTCHA Auth
- PoC Tool
 - TCP Traffic Model
 - HTTP Traffic Model





"Successfully Combating DDoS Attacks", Aug 2012



ATTACK CATEGORIES





Volumetric

Semantic

Blended

















\varTheta 🔿 🔿 🔛	Kill 'em All 1.0
Version 1.0 Caveat: * Only support IPv4. * Source IP not spoofable. * Limited CAPTCHA cracking capability. * Watermark embedded for easy detection.	
Source IP: auto detect	Number of connections: 10
Target URL:	Connections interval (second): 5.0
Authentication Bypass	Connection hold time before first request (second):1.0Connection idle timeout after last request (second):1.0
HTTP Cookie (Header field: Cookie) JavaScript CAPTCHA	HTTP Traffic Model Number of requests per connection: 10 Requests interval (second): 5.0
Reauth every (second): 300.0	Custom header:
Disclaimer: This tool is purely for education and rese is not responsible for any loss or dama	arch purposes. NT-ISAC and Bloodspear Labs ge arising from any use or misuse of this tool. KILL 'em !!
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WE DO IT AUTOMATICALLY

- Traffic Pattern simulation, e.g. Like traffic behind Proxy
- HTTP Header Simulation

Simulate Normal traffic Pattern and Behavior!!!!!



TRAFFIC PATTERN SIMULATION





HTTP HEADER SIMULATION

- HTTP header will change during the attack
- For example, first HTTP request for HTTP Header "Accept"





TCP OPTION EMPOWER

- TCP option against Detection
- Empower attack Power







MORE	HTTP ATTACK POW	ER
	Kill 'EM ALL!!!!!	
	SYN	
<	SYN ACK	High Memory, High CPU and no. of
	ACK	
	Push ACK (HTTP Request)	Service unavailable
<	ACK	
	Push ACK (HTTP Request)	
<	ACK	
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SOURCE HOST VERIFICATION

- TCP SYN Auth
- HTTP Redirect Auth
- HTTP Cookie Auth
- JavaScript Auth
- CAPTCHA Auth











EFFICIENCY HANDLE REAL USER

Handling a Real User access:

TCP REST

TCP out of Seq

TCP Flag	Total Length	TCP Flag	Total Length	
SYN	60	SYN	60	
SYN ACK	40	SYN ACK	40	
ACK	40	RST	40	
RST	40			
Total	180 Bytes	Total	140 Bytes	
P.S. TCP SYN Packet size = Header length + Total Length BLOODSPEAR NEWUSGUARD				
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SYN BYPASS TCP OUT-OF-SEQUENCE EASILY



REAL POWER OF SYN FLOOD

- The traditional SYN Flood is 40 bytes, missing TCP Option
- How to simulate a real SYN traffic:
 - In IP layer: Randomize TTL
 - In TCP layer: Randomize Window size, Correct Option added, e.g. Maximum Segment Size, etc.

48-60 bytes TCP SYN Flood attack is nightmare





HTTP REDIRECT AUTH

KEY TO BYPASS HTTP REDIRECT

- HTTP / 1.1 302 Found\r\n
- Location: http: a.c.com\r\n
- Loop the script, until "HTTP / 1.1 200 ok"





KEY TO BYPASS COOKIE AUTH

- Set-Cookie: AuthCode=d8e; expires=Mon, 23-Dec-2019 23:50:00 GMT;, etc
- If Date and time of Expire is between hour or minutes, it is the our REAUTH threshold!!!!!!!!
- If you saw this in third HTTP redirect request

Set-Cookie:AuthCode=deleted;.....bad luck

WTF?!





KEY TO BYPASS HEADER TOKEN AUTH

- API, AJAX or XHR2 is used to deploy header token
- Not all browser compatibility those Techniques
- Existing Mitigation devices can not fully using those Techniques
- Simulation the Traffic Flow BYPASS it!!!!





KEY TO BYPASS JS AUTH

- JavaScript is client-side-program
- Find the path "http://a.b.com/auth.js", download and analyze it.
- Challenge to embedded JavaScript in Botnet, guys using:
 - Simulate the traffic flow
 - Client Deployment Model
 - Server Deployment Model
- Kill 'Em All is below 1M bytes!!!!!!





CLIENT DEPLOYMENT MODEL



SERVER DEPLOYMENT MODEL

CAPTCHA AUTH



KEY TO BYPASS CAPTCHA AUTH

- JavaScript is client-side-program
- Find the path "http://a.b.com/auth.bmp", download and analyze it.
- Challenge to embedded CAPTCHA Engine in Botnet, guys using:
 - Simulate the traffic flow
 - Client Deployment Model
 - Server Deployment Model

DEFCON have FXXKING many CATPCHA engine!!!!



SOURCE HOST VERIFICATION



POC TOOL DESIGN

- 3 tries per authentication attempt (in practice more likely to success)
- True TCP/IP behavior thru use of OS TCP/IP stack
- Auth cookies persist during subsequent dialogues
- JavaScript execution using embedded JS engine (lack of complete DOM an obstacle to full emulation)





POC 🐨

CAPTCHA PWNAGE







CAPTCHA BYPASS DESIGN

- 1. Converted to black-and-white for max contrast
- 2. 3x3 median filter applied for denoising
- 3. Word segmentation
- 4. Boundary recognition
- 5. Pixel difference computed against character map





POC F





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Kill 'em All 1.0



Version 1.0 Caveat:

HTTP TRAFFIC MODEL









POC TOOL STRENGTHS

- True TCP/IP behavior (RST, resend, etc.) thru use of true OS TCP/IP stack
- Believable HTTP headers (User-Agent strings, etc.)
- Embedded JavaScript engine
- CAPTCHA solving capability
- Randomized payload
- Tunable post-authentication traffic model



TO THE BACKEND

• 44 Page views





TESTING ENVIRONMENT

Against Devices

Against Services



MITIGATION BYPASS

Auth Bypass



Testing results under specific conditions, valid as of Jul 13, 2013

Post-Auth

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MITIGATION BYPASS (PROTECTION SERVICES)

Auth Bypass

Detection		
Techniques	Cloudflare	Akamai
Source Host Verification		
TCP SYN Authentication	N/A	N/A
HTTP Redirect Authentication	PW.NED!	N/A
HTTP Cookie Authentication	PWNED!	N/A
JavaScript Authentication	PWNED!	N/A
CAPTCHA Authentication	×	N/A

Testing results under specific conditions, valid as of Jul 13, 2013

Post-Auth

Detection		
Techniques	Cloudflare	Akamai
Rate Measurement / Baseline Enforce-		
ment	N/A	N/A
Protocol Sanity & Behavior Checking	N/A	N/A
Proactive Resource Release	N/A	N/A
Big Data Analysis	N/A	N/A
Malicious Source		
Intelligence	N/A	N/A
Protocol Pattern Matching	N/A	N/A



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CHECK OUT NEW VERSION HERE !!